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Summary  findings
Shirley  and  Xu  anal  ze  experience  with  written  Performance  contracting  assumes  that  government's
performance  contra.its  between  developing  country  objectives  can  be maximized,  and  performance
governments  and the  maniagers of their  state-owned  improved,  by setting  targets  that  take  into  account  the
enterprises.  Such contracts  have been  a vogue  since  the  constraints  placed  on managers.  For  this  to occur,  the
mid-1980s,  and  substantial  resources  have been  sunk  into  principals  must  be willing  to explicitly  state  their
their  design  and  eniforcement,  yet the  few assessments  to  objectives,  assign  to them  priorities  and  weights,  translate
date  show  mixed  results.  them  into  performance  improvement  targets,  provide
Using a simple  agency  model,  they  identify  how  incentives  to meet  those  targets  (or monitor  the  agents
problems  of weak incentives  stemmning from  information  without  incurring  significant  costs),  and  credibly  signal
asymmetry.  lack of government  commitment,  and  lack of  their  commitment  to the contract.  These  conditions
managerial  commitment  can  lead to shirking.  failed  to materialize
TIlhey  appiv  the model  to a sample  of  12 contracts  with  Why  would  governments  adopt  contracts  to which
monopoiy  eitterpriscs  in six developing  countries  they  were  not  committed  or  that  were  politically
(Ghana,  India,  the Republic  of Korea,  Mexico,  the  unrealistic?  Sometimes  because  it enabled  them  to get
Philippines,  ancd  Senegal).  All suffer  from  serious  foreign  assistance.
contracting  problems.  They  find  no pattern  of improved  How  explain  the  managers'  lack of commitment?  Not
performance  that  can be attributed  to the contracts.  surprisingly,  managers  with  information  advantages  and
Only  three  of the  12 case-study  companies  showed  a  bargaining  power,  and  with  no strong  incentives  or
turnarounlld  in total  factor  productivity  after  contracts  commitment  from  the government,  used  their  advantages
were  introduced,  six c,ontinued  past  trends,  and three  to  manipulate  the targets  so as to  ensure  that  their
perfornmed substantially  worse  under  contracts  than  they  performance  would  be judged  satisfactory.
had before.  Labor  productivity  improved  at a faster  pace  Shirley and  Xu outline  the  conditions  under  which
m  four  cases, and  deteriorated  in nonie, but  the  performance  contracts  might  succeed  in improving
mrproveoenrt  predated  the co;  tFact.  performance.
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I.  Introduction
Written contracts between governments and state-owned enterprises (SOE) have
enjoyed a vogue since the mid- 1980s. Our survey of developing countries found 565 such
contracts in 32 countries plus another 103,000 in China as of June, 1994 (table 1). We
defined these contracts, which we termed performance contracts, as negotiated, written
agreements between governments and the managers of their SOEs which specify explicit
targets that SOE management pledges to achieve in a given time frame, and where
performance is measured at the end of a specified period. I  Substantial resources have
been sunk into the design and enforcement of these contracts, yet the few assessments to
date show mixed results (see, for example, Shirley 1989, 1991; Nellis 1989; Trivedi
1990).
SOEs face more than the usual principal-agent problems.  Typically, the agent
(SOE management in this case) has more information than the principal (government)
and can choose how much effort to expend. (For a review of the theoretical arguments
see, Ross 1991; Stiglitz 1974; Sappington 1991.) The principal can only observe
outcomes and cannot measure accurately the effort expended by the agent or distinguish
the effects of effort from other factors affecting performance (Laffont and Tirole 1986).
The assumption in much of the literature is that the principal is a residual claimant whose
objective is to maximize his or her returns, and will monitor management effort
accordingly.  If there are multiple principals, they will share the same objective (although
smaller stakeholders may try to free ride on the monitoring efforts of larger ones).  If the3
shares of the enterprise are traded in a highly liquid stock market, the stockowners may
choose to exit, in which case a large shareholder may take over the firm, oust the old
manager and appoint a new, more capable one.  The threat of such a takeover may act as a
check on the behavior of incumbent managers.
SOEs, however, have no clear residual claimants; they are subject to multiple
principals who impose multiple, often conflicting objectives and constraints on the
enterprise (Jones, "The Linkage Between Objectives and Control Mechanisms in the
Public Manufacturing Systems" in Trevedi, 1990). These multiple principals may derive
benefits from objectives which run contrary to improving economic performance. For
example, politicians may benefit politically from instructing SOEs to maximize
employment (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). Bureaucrats might benefit from instructing
SOEs to engage in activities that increase their power, prestige or perks (Buchannan et. al
1980). Besides the lack of a clear residual claimant, SOEs are often monopolies not
subject to bankruptcy, and are also not vulnerable to takeover (Vickers and Yarrow
1988). As a result, it is especially difficult to judge managerial performance or to
motivate managers to exert effort.
A written performance contract can be seen as a forcing mechanism to clarify
objectives and make it easier to judge performance and motivate managers.  The contract
is negotiated between representatives of the multiple principals and the SOE, and
translates the multiple goals into targets measured by specified criteria (Jones,
"Performance Evaluation for State-Owned Enterprises" in Ramamurti and Vernon 1991).
Targets can be weighted to reflect government priorities and provide further clarity.4
Management can be motivated to improve performance through bonuses based on
achievement of the targets, while poor performance can be penalized through firing or
demotion.
An implicit assumption underlying such contracts is that even as government's
social or political objectives are being maximized, performance on economic measures
can still be improved, by setting targets that allow for improvements within the
constraints imposed by these noneconomic objectives.  For example, even though a
government requires a SOE to keep its labor force at current levels despite overstaffing,
the company could still achieve contractual targets aimed at, for instance,  improving
quality or minimizing materials costs.  Constraints are taken into account by selecting
targets and/or criteria that measure only those factors which management can control.
For instance,  performance can be judged against past trends, rather than against some
objective standard, to take account of factors which management can't change much from
year to year. Thus, even if management can't reduce overstaffing they may still be able
to improve the trend in labor productivity by expanding production through better use of
plant and equipment.  Or, to give another example, trends in profitability may be
measured in constant prices to take account of management's inability to raise prices in
real terms.
Drawing on the work of Sappington (1991), Lafont and Tirole (1987) and
Willamson (1976 and 1985),2 we hypothesized that how well a contract does in
improving SOE economic performance depends on how well it addresses three
interrelated problems: information asymmetry, incentives, and commitment. Information5
problems arise because the contracting agents have different sets of information, and it
may be costly to get information about whether the terms have been honored; thus each
side can use the information it holds exclusively to improve its position at the expense of
the other. At the same time, because not all contingencies can be fully anticipated and
accounted for, it is impossible to design a contract that will cover all eventualities.  To
induce the contracting parties to comply with the contract's provisions, contracts include
promises of  incentives (rewards and penalties).  But where information is imperfect and
it is costly for government to pay the incentive, the reward may be set too low to motivate
managers to improve performance.  Since managers face a disutility of effort, under such
low incentives they will shirk.
Each party must be convinced of the commitment of the other to honor the
contract now and as circumstances change, but when government is one of the
contracting parties it may be difficult or impossible to force government to comply.
There may be no neutral third parties with the power to compel the government or its
successors to meet its promises.  Government in developing countries may face especially
serious problems making credible commitments because the institutions (checks and
balances, reputation, etc.) which curb arbitrary actions and bind successor administrations
to the promises of their predecessors are weak (North and Weingast 1989; Levy and
Spiller 1996). If managers believe that there is a high probability that government will
renege on its commitments (such as the commitment to pay an incentive), they will not
invest in learning or exert effort to improve results.  Managerial commitment is also6
important.  If managers are not committed to the contract, they may try to bargain that
they are not punished regardless of the firm's performance.
The next section of this article presents a simple, agency theoretic model to
illustrate how these contracting problems may affect performance.  Section III examines
how a sample of contracts dealt with each of the contracting problems and Section IV
measures the success or failure of the contracts against objective, quantitative measures of
firm performance. Section V concludes with an assessment of the findings and the policy
implications.
II.  The Model
To illustrate how the problems of performance contracts affect SOE performance,
we first develop a static model to show that, when enterprises have an information
advantage the government will choose lower-powered incentives, which lead to an
efficiency loss compared to when the government has complete information. Next we
give two examples under a dynamic setup to show how the lack of commitment by either
of the contracting parties can hurt SOE preformance. The theoretical arguments offered
here emphasize the role of the manager in enterprise performance, and synthesize
standard arguments of information economics in the context of SOE performance
contracts.
A.  Information Asymmetry, Incentives and Performance: Static Analysis7
We make use of Freixas et al (1985) to compare the performance of an enterprise
with and without an information advantage. 3 Consider an enterprise which produces
output y of a product whose social value is p. The technology is characterized by
(1)  y = eO
where e is managerial effort, and 0  is the firm-specific efficiency level, beyond the
control of the manager. Other inputs such as capital and labor are omitted based on the
assumption that such inputs are observable to the government. By working hard the
manager  incurs  disutility y (e), with y '(e)  > 0, and tj  "(e) >  0
The government tries to motivate the manager using the following performance
contract:
(2)  R(y)  = a + by = a + beO
where R is the reward to the manager: a is the manager's base salary independent of the
level of output and assumed to be positive, and b represents the power of incentives.
Linearity of the performance contract is assumed to simplify the analysis. 4 In transferring
$1 to an enterprise, the government incurs costs of $(1 + ?), where k  is the additional
costs associated with distortionary taxes and with administrating enterprises by
bureaucrats (such as planning, monitoring, and verifying inputs and output).  The
manager maximizes his utility function,
(3)  7t  F  =a+  beO -(e),
while the social welfare of the rest of the world is
(4)  7r ° = peO - (1 +  X)(a  + beO)
So the objective function of a benevolent government is8
(5)  W=peO-y,(e)-X(a+beO)
The Optimal Static Incentive Scheme under Complete Information
There are two types of firms: firms with better technology (9 ), and the others (0).  With
complete information the government knows the type of an enterprise, and since it is
costly to transfer funds to the enterprise, the government will maximize W while making
the manager's  utility just equal to his or her reservation utility, which without loss of
generality is assumed to be 0. So the government hopes to solve the optimal incentive
intensity b from the following problem:
Max  W = peO -y  (e) - k(a + beO)
=6_(1+)[  P  eO-(a+beO)]+(a+beO  -y(e))
(6) 
s.t.  a + beO = v  (e)
v '(e) =  bO
The last equation is the rationality constraint -- the first order conditon for the manager to
maximize  i  F;  the equation before the last one reflects the government's intention to
leave no rent to the firm.  Substituting the first constraint into the objective function,
taking a derivative with respect to b, then substituting y '(e)  = bO , we get the optimal
incentive intensity with perfect information:
(7)  b  =  P  5
The right hand, denoted as s, is the shadow price of output to the government: the
government incurs a social cost of $ (1 + X) to induce the enterprise to produce $1 worth
of output.
Static Incentive Scheme Under Incomplete Information9
Now suppose the enterprise manager has an information advantage. While the manager
knows his or her enterprise's type (6  orO ), the government presumes that a firm's
technology parameter is:
0  O with probability (1- v)
=  with probability v
Denote  e(b), e(b)  as the utility-maximizing efforts when the bonus intensity is b for firms
with type 0  and 0 . Since firms with better technology (0  type) have a higher marginal
product, the first-order condition of the enterprise implies that e(b) > e(b).
The maximization problem of the government now becomes
max W = v{p0e(b) -y  (e(b)) - X[a  + bOe(b)]}
+((  - v){p0e(b) -W (e(b)) - X[a  + bOe(b)]}
(9)  s.t  v  (e(b)) = a + bOe(b)
(10)  bO  W=i'(e)
bO  =  '(e)
Constraint (9) says that the government will design a payment scheme so that the
manager of an inefficient type will receive his or her reservation utility level and nothing
more: the government hates to transfer any more than necessary to its SOEs since it costs
the society an extra $ X  .Constraint (10) implies that managers of both types of enterprise
will maximize their utilities.
Substitute (9) and (10) into (8), we get
W = v{jp0e(b) - (1 +  )Wi  (e(b))} + (1 - v){pOe(b) - v  (e(b)) - X' (e(b))  - X b[Oe(b)  - 0e(b)]}
Taking the derivative with respect to b and setting it to zero, we get: 510
X__  Oe
(11)  s-b*=  (l-v)  +-e  Oe
(11) implies that b* <  s . So when the  firm 's manager has an information advantage, the
government will set a lower incentive than in the case ofperfect  information (in which
b *=s). Since e'(b) > 0 and e'(b) > 0, it follows that the performance of both types of
firms  will be lower under imperfect information than under perfect information.
B.  Commitment and Effectiveness of Performance Contracts
The effectiveness of contracts depends not only on information and incentives but
also on commitment. Although there are various ways in which lack of commitment is
important to contracts, here we illustrate two types of lack of commitment:  the
government's commitment not to appropriate firm-specific investments of the manager;
and the manager's commitment to stick to the terms of the performance contract.
Expropriation Risks due to the Lack of Commitment by  the Government
In this example the lack of commitment by the government reduces the returns of
firm-specific investment and the manager's efforts.  Consider a two-period setup: t=O, 1.
In period 0, the manager sinks a firm-specific, non-contractible investment of I, which
will improve output of period 1 by  K(I).  The manager's investment can be viewed as his
or her time spent on learning about the firm (its technology, personnel, and market),
which is lost when he or she leaves the firm, as well as his or her efforts in managing the
firm.  We assume K'(I)  >  0, and K"(I)  <  0;  So returns to investment has diminishing
returns. The output in period 1 is e,O, + K(I).11
The government announces its plans to reward the enterprise with the static
optimal compensation scheme:  R, = a + by,.  This is justified by a well-known result in
regulation theory that in a stable dynamic setup with asymmetric information, it is
optimal to repeat the optimal static incentive scheme in each period. 6 The government,
however, deviates from the optimal in that it has a commitment problem: based on past
observations, the manager expects the government to renege on its performance contract
with probability X (m) . In other words,
with probability  the government will compensate the manager regardless of
X (m):  outcomes, R, = R,,  a constant exogenously set.
with probability  the government will abide by the performance contract so that
I -Tr  (m)  :  R, =a+ by,.
A larger m implies a stronger commitment to performance contract,  (m) < 0.  The
dm
manager decides to work at the intensity e, at the beginning of period t, and decides to
invest I at the beginning of period 0; the government rewards the firm at the end of each
period.
Assume the intertemporal discount rate is ,  , then the utility function is
WF  = (1-t(m))(a  +beo 0 0)  +t(m)R0 - .i(eo)-I
+3 {(I -T m.)[a +  b(eiO, + K(I))] + T (m)R, - x(e,)}
The manager's  optimal investment and effort are solved from the first order conditions:
1  = [1  -t(m)]  P  bk'(I)
(13)  N4  '(eo) = [1 -t(m)]b0O0
T '(e ) = [1-st (m)]  bO 
The comparative-static analysis yields that12
a  >  0,  and  A-  >  0,  where X  = I, eO, e,
It then follows that  '  > 0, t = 0,1  . So a stronger commitment of the government will
am
improve the performance of enterprises by encouraging investment and inducing larger
effort per period.7
The Manipulative Firm
In this subsection we consider an example in which the manager can use his or her
bargaining power to ex post reduce the threshold for punishment in his or her own favor.
We might not observe the manager reducing the punishment threshold in firms with
substantial bargaining power because they can manipulate the performance criteria ex
ante (though this manipulation does not fall under the category of commitment). In the
extreme, a manipulative firm can set itself the targets within easy reach. In general, the
more bargaining power a firm has (in part due to its information advantage), the easier the
targets the firm can obtain; as a result, the lower the effort and learning the manager and
the employees will yield, thus the worse the performance.
In firms without such strong ex ante bargaining power, or firms with such powers
yet can still bargain down performance criteria ex post, we will see managerial non-
commitment when the manager expects to be able to bargain down the performance
criterion ex post. The government hopes to use the following performance contract,
which punishes the manager with no rewards when  R, < R,  a constant:
Event:  Reward to the manager R,:
Period 0:  a+ beoO <  R  O13
a+be0O 2 R  a + be O
Period  I  a+b(e,  +  k(1))e  < R  0
a+b(e,  +k(I))0  > R  a+b(e,  +k(I))0
The  manager  ex  ante  agrees  to  the  terms,  knowing  that  in the  second  period  he  or
she  can  bargain  for  a  lower  performance  criterion  R  < R,  and  thus  avoid  punishment  as
long  as  R,  > R. Then,  the  manager  is motivated  by  the  expectation  of  the  ex  post  rewards
and  punishment,  summarized  as  follows:
Event:  Reward  to the  manager  R,:
Period O:  a+be 0 O  <R  0
a+ beOo 2 R  a + beO3
PeriodI  a+b(e  +k(I))O  <R  0
a+ b(e, + k(I))O > R  a + b(e, + k(I))O
A  crucial  but  plausible  assumption  for  the  following  proof  is that  09(0)  is
monotonously  increasing  over  the  relevant  range  when  0  belongs  to the  range  defined  by
K  <  R, <  R R.  In  our  context,  since  the  government  is likely  to  set  R well  below  the  mean
or  the  median  of  0,  and  R  is even  lower,  0 p (0)  is most  likely  increasing  over  the  range
bounded  by  the  two  thresholds.
Now  compare  the  objective  functions  with  and  without  managerial  commitment.
The  manager  is committed  when  he  or  she  exerts  effort  to  exceed  the  punishment
threshold  R in both  periods,  and  is not  committed  when  he  or  she  expects  to  bargain
down  the  punishment  threshold  to  R  (R  < R)  in the  second  period.  The  managerial




(14)  UNC  -UC  f (a +Kb( (e,  +K(I))(pO)dO
R-a
b(e1 +K(I))
Obviously, optimal e(  is the same with or without managerial commitment. Yet,
optimal e, and I will decrease, as the following can be proved: 9
MRNC  - MRC 1 <0
MR I  - MRI  <0
NC  C
Thus in this example, relative to managerial commitment, managerial non-
commitment leads to declining efforts of managers over time, and a suboptimal
investment. Empirically, managerial non-commitment to contract should be shown in
decling stringency of targets over time.
III.  Empirical Application
Our  model suggests that information asymmetries lead governments to provide
low powered incentives that don't  induce managers to exert as much effort as under
perfect information. It further predicts that lack of commitment will also lead to lower
performance.  To test these hypotheses we first examined how performance contracts
addressed problems of information, incentives and commitment in a sample of twelve
companies in six countries, as shown in table 2.  (For ease of reading we have used
simplified enterprise names; see table 2.)  We then measured performance trends after the
year of the contract and compared them with pre-contract trends.15
Our analysis is based on the contract documents and reports from the monitoring
agency, a questionnaire administered to each sample company and government
monitoring agency, World Bank file data, interviews in the field and with knowledgeable
World Bank staff, and the enterprises' own audited accounts and reports.'I  The sample is
small and not random, so care must be used in generalizing from the results."  I  Also there
are weaknesses in the data: accounting is weak in Ghana and Senegal, and in some cases
our precontract period is short and the length of the postcontract period varies, which
makes it hard to measure trends.12 Even so, the sample does include countries at very
different levels of income that employed varying approaches to performance contracting.
An improvement in postcontract performance across such differing country and contract
experiences would suggest that the contracts can reduce the three contracting problems
(unless other exogenous factors were at work, something we also investigated).'3
A.  Information Asymmetries and Incentives
Our first hypothesis is that in the presence of information asymmetries governments
are likely to use lower powered incentives.  Competition between firms for the market or
bidding between potential managers for the privilege of operating the firm increases
government's  information by allowing comparisons between the firms' performance or
the managers' bids.  However, all of the sample enterprises were monopolies and none of
the contracts were competitively bid, so this form of information revelation was not
employed.
The information disadvantage of governments was also manifested by that all of the
government agencies responsible for negotiating, monitoring and evaluating (henceforth16
supervisors) used SOEs' annual, audited accounts for the information, but the quality of
these data varied, and in five of the cases (three in Ghana and two in Senegal) were very
poor.  For example, in 1991, twelve of the seventeen SOEs supervised by the State
Enterprise Commission of Ghana (or SEC) were seven weeks late in delivering their 1990
fourth quarter results.  Only five of the firms had current audited accounts; the most
recent audited accounts for the others ranged from one to three years old (State Enterprise
Commission 1991).  Similar problems were cited in interviews in Senegal, where
enterprises were also reported to evaluate themselves.'4 Moreover, as we show below,
the enterprise managers had considerable bargaining power in all the cases except the two
SOEs in Korea, which made it difficult for the government supervisors to demand better
information.  The low status and pay of the government bureaucrats responsible for
supervising the contracts meant that the skills available to assess and process the
information were also low.  Korea, and to a lesser extent, India, used outside experts to
supplement the skills of the bureaucrats which helped reduce its information problems
(see section III.C).
As expected, the information problems led to low powered incentives. 15 Managers
and staff could receive a pecuniary bonus for good achievement of their targets in only
two of the 12 sample contracts (Korea Electricity and Korea Telecoms).  In the two
Korean cases, the staff of the company could get a bonus of up to three months salary for
"A" graded performance.  Bonuses are also part of the contracts in the three sample
contracts in Ghana, but according to survey responses promised bonuses have not been
paid.  In two other contracts (India Electricity and Oil) managers could receive an award17
for good performance in a public ceremony, but interviews suggest that this was not
viewed as a very strong motivation.
Thus, with the exception of Korea, governments opted for low powered incentives.
The bonuses in Korea were high powered incentives in part because they were paid to all
staff; managers reported feeling pressured to improve performance so as not to disappoint
their employees (Shirley 1990). Moreover, bonus ratings were reported in the media,
which managers stated was a strong motivating force (Ibid.).  Since Korea had less
information problems than the other countries, its experience lends support to our
conjecture that information asymmetry leads to lower power incentives.
B.  Lack of Government Commitment
Our model next suggests that the expectation that government will renege will lead
managers to underinvest in improving the performance of their firms.  While the model
suggests one way governments might renege is by not paying the promised bonus, the
government could also renege by not taking the actions necessary for management to
achieve the targets.  Governments made explicit promises in all but four of the contracts
(the exceptions are the two Korean and two Philippines contracts) to take actions that
were crucial to the successful achievement of the targets.  Although the contracts in the
Philippines did not include such obligations, many of the targets (such as financial and
profitability measures in current prices or labor productivity) partly depended on
government actions (such as allowing tariff adjustments or lay offs) to be achieved, which
could be taken as an implicit promise.  Only in the cases of Korea Telecoms and
Electricity were the targets - for example, transmission losses, thermal efficiency,18
minutes of outages per household, and profitability in constant prices-not  directly
dependent on government decisions. The governments in our sample not only controlled
prices of factors and products, decisions about wages and layoffs, procurement above
minimal levels, and all senior appointments, they also strongly influenced whether the
SOE was paid by its customers (and had to pay its suppliers or creditors). Eighty eight
percent of respondents to our questionnaire cited one of the factors under government
control (hiring, firing, payment of government's and other SOEs' receivables to the firm,
pricing policy, etc.) as the number one obstacle interfering with the achievement of the
objectives of the contracts.16
To assess whether government was credible in its commitment to provide the
promised incentives and to honor its promises under the contract, we looked for the
presence of enforcement mechanisms.  We also checked whether governments took
costly actions to signal commitment to managers (see Spence 1973; Lupia and
McCubbins 1996) for discussions of costly action to signal credibility).  Since the sample
contracts were all repeated games (most were annual, see table 2), we also looked at
government's compliance in  the early contracts as a signal of its credibility in later
contracts.
Enforcement.  None of the contracts specify an enforcement mechanism in the sense
of a neutral third party, insulated from politics, with the power and information to compel
both parties to comply.  In several cases, however, government obligations were
potentially enforceable by an outside party. The World Bank included government
contractual obligations as covenants in its loans for SOEs in Ghana, Mexico and Senegal.19
(Although these covenants were drawn up on the basis of project or sector needs rather
than because they were part of the contracts, governments' agreement to the World Bank
loan could be interpreted as a signal of commitment to the contract as well).  Interviews
suggested that the influence of this outside involvement was mixed.  It may have helped
the contracts'  credibility in Ghana and Mexico, but it appears to have reduced the
contracts'  credibility in Senegal.  Survey respondents and other observers agreed that the
contracts in Senegal were viewed by the signatories as donor driven and not as credible
obligations.  The suspension of disbursement of a World Bank loan to Senegal Electricity
after government reneged on its contract obligations to settle arrears to the company did
not change government behavior and penalized the company as much as, if not more
than, the government.  The contract expired in 1989; by mid- 1995 the government and
Senegal Electricity management had yet to agree on a new contract.  The role of outside
pressure from agencies such as the World Bank is necessarily a limited one, since such
agencies are not party to the contract and have, at best, only an indirect stake in the
outcome.
The participation of private individuals (non-government accountants, lawyers, and
academics) and a prestigious government think tank, the autonomous Korea Development
Institute, may have increased the credibility of government's commitment to the contracts
with Korea Electricity and Telecoms. Knowledgeable outsiders may have informally
monitored the government supervisors and acted as a check on government actions that
would have violated the contract.  Moreover, they had a more direct stake in the outcome,
than, for example, the World Bank; such outsiders stated in interviews that they felt their20
reputation was on the line in the highly publicized evaluation process in Korea (Shirley
1991). India also used outside evaluators, although their role was more limited then in
Korea where the outside team had primary responsibility for evaluation.
Costly Action.  Many of the government actions promised in the contracts were
politically costly.  For example, since SOE jobs are used to reward political supporters in
many countries (Shleifer and Vishny 1994), allowing managers to lay off redundant
workers would be a strong signal of commitment to the contract.  It would also be
politically costly to divert revenues from other uses to pay government bills to the firm
and to fund government mandated investments, allow the firm to pursue its creditors and
apply legal penalties if they did not pay, and regulate monopoly prices according to clear
and reasonable rules that would allow the firm enough revenue to service its debt,
maintain and improve service, upgrade technology, and expand to meet demand (which
would mean price increases for powerful consumers).  Costly signals were sent only in
the contracts with the two SOEs in Korea.  When performance contracts were introduced
in Korea in 1983-84, managerial autonomy of the two SOEs in our sample (and of all
other so-called Government Invested Enterprises) was increased.'7 This seems to have
boosted the contracts' credibility with managers and employees.  However, some of
those interviewed cited waning government commitment to performance contracting in
Korea in recent years, raising doubts about whether this credibility had been sustained.'9
Reneging.  The model suggests that if governments renege by failing to pay the
promised incentives to managers who achieve their performance targets, the SOEs will
yield sub-optimal performance. In three of the five contracts where bonuses were part of21
the agreement  (the contracts  with the three SOEs  in Ghana)  government  reneged  on its
promised  incentive  payments. Governments  also reneged  on the promises  they made
from the beginning  of the contract  process  in Ghana,  India and Senegal  (table 3). This
early reneging  hurt the credibility  of government  commitment  to the subsequent
contracts. For example,  every  year  the contract  for India Electricity  promised
government  help in enforcing  prompt  payment  from its customers,  the State Electricity
Boards,  yet accounts  receivable  went from 149  days in 1986,  the year  before the contract
was introduced,  to 207 in 1990;  in 1991  they fell to 150  days when a power  plant was
turned over to the SOE  in partial  payment  of arrears. Similar  reneging  occurred  in the
first contracts  in Senegal. We already  described  Senegal  Electricity's  refusal  to sign a
second  contract. The government's  failure  to honor its obligations  to Senegal  Telecom
evoked  this comment  in a 1989  company  report:  "It must be remembered  that the
contract plan was never considered a binding contract by the public powers."
Government  credibility  may have  been greater  in the contracts  in Ghana, since  the
government  met some  of its early  promises. For example,  even  though the government
of Ghana  did not always approve  Ghana  Water's  tariff  increases  promptly  and required
the company  to serve  some  nonpaying  customers,  it did increase  tariffs  in real terms and
support  management  in reducing  the work force. Furthermore,  all three contracts  in
Ghana  provided  for recalculation  of targets  if government  reneged  on its contractual
obligations. Although  this betrays  a disconcerting  expectation  that government  will
renege,  it also means that SOEs  were  not penalized  for government  misbehavior. As we
mentioned,  the Mexican  government  met its obligations  in the contract  with the22
Electricity  Company,  albeit  with some  delay. 20 Finally,  the Government  of the
Philippines  reneged  on its implicit  promises  by, for example,  not requiring  the public
sector to promptly  pay its bills to the SOEs.
In sum, due to weak  enforcement,  lack of costly signals  and/or  early reneging,
government  commitment  to the performance  contracts  in Ghana,  India, the Philippines
and Senegal  was not credible,  while  the Mexican  contract  may have  been marginally
credible. Only Korea  managed  to formulate  targets  that were not directly  dependent  on
government  action,  institute  an enforcement  mechanism  that used outside  evaluators  to
enhance  credibility,  and take costly action  to signal  commitment.
C.  Lack of Management  Commitment
The model suggests  that if managers  lack  commitment  and have bargaining  power
they  will try to avoid punishment  when  their performance  falls  below  target. We looked
for evidence  of managerial  bargaining  power by comparing  the status of the SOE
negotiators  with the status  of the government  supervisors  responsible  for negotiating,
monitoring  and evaluating  the contracts. We also analyzed  the targets  for evidence  that
managers  were manipulating  the performance  criteria.
Managerial  Bargaining  Power. In all but Korea  and India (where  outsiders  played a
role,  described  above)  contracts  were negotiated,  monitored  and evaluated  by middle-  or
low-level  civil servants,  while the SOE's representatives  were better paid and had much
higher status. For example,  in Ghana  the SOEs  were  often represented  at the bargaining
table by a managing  director  with status equivalent  to a cabinet  minister  (and better  pay),
while  the government  supervisory  agency  was usually  represented  by a low-level23
functionary.21 In contrast, Korea's contracts are evaluated by an ad hoc task force
composed of private individuals (nongovernment accountants, lawyers, academics, etc.)
and a prestigious government think tank, the autonomous Korean Development Institute.
However, the negotiations in both Korea and India were done by the government
bureaucrats.  The lower status of the government supervisors made it hard for them to
negotiate tough targets and demand the information necessary for evaluating performance
or to give the SOEs an unsatisfactory score.  Outsiders were more likely to rival the status
of the SOE representatives and be able to overcome some of the managers'  bargaining
power.  However, since the outsiders in both Korea and India were brought into the
process on an ad hoc basis their lack of continuity may have reduced their opportunity to
learn about the company's performance over time.
Asymmetry in the status of the government supervisory agencies vis-a-vis the
managers was aggravated in some of our sample contracts because supervisors were
weakened by frequent changes in responsibilities and authority.  Specifically, the
supervisory agency in Senegal was moved twice after contracting began (from the
Presidency to the Prime Minister's office to the Ministry of Finance).  According to
interviews, these moves diluted its authority vis-a-vis the enterprises.  Similar changes
undermined the authority of the responsible agencies in the Philippines (where the
supervisory agency also has a high rate of staff turnover) and Ghana.22 In contrast, the
contracts in India, Mexico and Korea were negotiated, monitored and evaluated by more
stable agencies.24
We expected that if managers are not committed they would manipulate the
targets to avoid punishment.  Punishment was avoided by most of our sample SOEs. Only
in the case of the two Korean contracts was there any evidence that management
achievements had some effect on managerial careers (Shirley 1991); interviews in the
other countries revealed that managers' job assignments were largely politically
determined and not driven by performance.23 None of the sample received a less than
satisfactory grade against the contract criteria, so there was no basis for government to
discipline the managers or not pay the promised incentives. This suggests that an
important manifestation of low managerial commitment was bargaining for targets that
could be attained without increased investment or effort.
Targets. There is anecdotal evidence that some targets are easily attained:
*  Senegal Telecom's target for call completion rates was lower in the 1986 performance
contract than in the company's business plan of ten years before. In 1992 the call
completion rate was a mere 55 percent in Dakar and less than 40 percent for inter-
urban calls, about half  the international industry standard.
*  In India, negotiations on targets sometimes dragged on so long that the targets were
set to be the same as actual performance. 24
*  In Ghana contract targets were set by the companies themselves; the supervisory
agency considered many targets too low and established a penalty for under-targeting
(State Enterprise Commission 1991).
*  In the Philippines, one of Philippines Electricity's most important and difficult
challenges was to improve its reliability, but its reliability indicator (the percentage of25
electricity which its customers have contracted for but the company never supplied)
became less important in its performance score, falling from 30 percent of total
targets in 1990 to 10 percent in 1991 and 15 percent in 1992. This is not because the
firm  became more reliable; on the contrary, by  1992-93 outages of seven hours per
day were common in many parts of the country.  25
Korea used a comprehensive target for assessing performance of the sample
enterprises, public profitability in constant prices.  (This indicator follows a trend
very close to total factor productivity and can be calculated using shadow prices to
account for price distortions; as a target it would be had to manipulate.) 26  The share
of public profitability in the contracts for Korea Telecoms and Electricity fell from 20
percent to  12 percent from 1985 to 1992. Field interviews suggest that this occurred
because SOE managers successfully negotiated the addition of other targets at the
expense of public profitability.
Besides this anecdotal evidence there is comprehensive evidence that all of the
sample contracts had targets which put the government supervisors at a serious
disadvantage vis-a-vis the enterprise representatives. All but two of the sample contracts
had either many targets (seven had more than 20 targets on average) or targets which
changed frequently (four changed more than 20 percent of their targets a year on
average), or both (figure 1). For example, Korea Telecoms' contracts had about 40
targets, most with weights of 1 percent or less.  On average, over one third of the targets
in the contracts with the three SOEs in Ghana changed every year.  Each time a new
criterion is added, evaluators had to decide on the criterion value-what  constitutes good,26
fair, or poor performance.  Recall that the targets in performance contracts for SOEs were
based on improvements over past performance, rather than some objective standard,
which required the government supervisors to learn about what constituted good
performance for each individual firm.  Learning which values are hard and which soft is
more difficult when criteria are numerous or constantly changing. 27
One way to make it easier to judge performance is to assign a weight to each target so
they add up to 100 percent and the supervisor can calculate an aggregate score.  While
most of our sample used weighted targets (the exceptions are in Senegal and Mexico),
fluctuations in the weights frequently offset this advantage, adding another layer of
complexity and uncertainty.  For example, the weight assigned to India Oil's financial
targets went from 20 percent in 1989 to 12 percent in 1990, then climbed to 40 percent by
1992.28
Such numerous, unstable, and increasingly less stringent targets indicate that
uncommitted managers were exploiting their bargaining power to negotiate targets that
maximized their information advantage. And indeed, field interviews suggested that
managers often negotiated for changes or additions to targets.  However, another factor
may also be partly responsible.  As mentioned, SOEs faced numerous objectives from
multiple principals; the government supervisors may have had trouble mediating among
the different vies and opted for numerous, relatively evenly weighted targets.  Since the
political strength of the principals changed from time to time, this could account for some
of the fluctuations in the targets. 2927
In sum, the managers in our sample had bargaining power and used it to
manipulate the performance criteria to avoid penalty or to assure reward, as the model
suggested.
D.  Contracting  Problems: Summary
Our model suggests three ways in which performance contracts might fail; as figure 1
shows, all but the two contracts with the SOEs in Korea evidence all three kinds of
failure: low power incentives stemming from information asymmetries; lack of
government commitment; and lack of managerial commitment. Korea does better than
the rest of the sample on the first two, but fails on managerial commitment.  The next
sections examines how the contracts did in improving SOE performance.
IV.  The Impact of the Contracts on Performance
Our next task was to determine whether enterprise performance changed in ways
that could be attributed to the contract (or, more weakly, in ways that the contracts could
not be ruled out as explanatory factors). To assess the companies' economic performance
we compared trends in profitability (return on assets, or ROA), labor productivity (LP)
and total factor productivity (TFP) before and after the introduction of the contract.30
ROA was calculated as sales minus cost of goods sold and depreciation over revalued
fixed assets.3' TFP was calculated as the constant value of production over the constant
costs of all production factors (labor, intermediate inputs and capital), using company
volume data to construct company-specific price indices for each factor and output where
available; otherwise we used the relevant country-specific price indices.  LP was
calculated as the real value of production divided by the number of workers.28
Our counterfactual was based on the trend in the three measures before the
contract was introduced.  We assumed that if the contracts made a difference we would
see a noticeable kink in trend in the period after the year in which the contract was
introduced.  A noticeable kink was defined as a move from a negative trend to a positive
trend (or vice versa), or a more than doubling of the rate of change. We had to use
relatively stringent criteria because of the small sample size and the lack of a control
(such as an SOE without a contract).
A frequent question is why did we not assess how well the firms did on their non-
economic objectives, especially since some observers consider these more important for a
state enterprise than its economic objectives, and success in these goals may be
responsible for (and outweigh) failures in economic performance measures?  Since 75
percent of the respondents to our questionnaire saw improving profitability or efficiency
as the number one objective of the contracts and 88 percent, as objective number one or
two, and since two thirds of the score of the enterprises were based on economic
achievements, we deemed improvement on ROA, LP and TFP as better measures of the
success of the contracts than non-economic achievements.32 Moreover, as we noted in
the introduction, an important rationale for performance contracts is to maximize
economic performance withjn the constraints of non-economic goals. 33
Profitability. None of the twelve sample companies improved their trend in ROA
after the contract. Nine continued to improve or deteriorate without a noticeable change
in their trends, while three showed worse ROA trends after contracts than before
(Philippines Electricity, Senegal Electricity, and Senegal Telecoms; see figure 2).  ROA29
trends in state-owned enterprises may reflect government behavior more than managerial
behavior, since the sample's product prices were controlled by the government.  (Some
important factor prices were also controlled; for example, government set prices for
Senegal Electricity's petroleum inputs at about twice world market prices in the 1980s
without always allowing it to raise its price to the consumer.) 34 The profitability trends
in the sample suggest that the contracts had little impact on government's pricing
behavior.  Only one company did better because of government mandated price increases
(Philippine Water), and these gains were not enough to change its almost flat trend in
ROA.  As for the deteriorating firms, one (Senegal Telecom) shows worse ROA because
of government pricing decisions, mainly because the government reduced its very high
base tariffs.
Labor Productivity.  Labor productivity growth was positive in all twelve cases, but
the data suggest that the contracts had little impact on this trend. Only two companies
show a kink in their labor productivity trends (declining labor productivity began to
increase in Senegal Telecoms, and the rate of increase in labor productivity more than
quadrupled after the contract in Ghana Water; see figure 3.); in the rest, labor productivity
continued its precontract trend upward.  In only four of the twelve cases was labor
productivity growth primarily due to the shedding of excess workers (plus the removal
from the rolls of "ghost workers").  Consistent with this finding, 53 percent of
respondents to the questionnaire (N=  17) ranked inability to dismiss unnecessary workers
as the number one obstacle to achieving the contract's goals.  In the other eight,
production gains outstripped employment increases.  Since labor productivity could be30
raised by increasing the use of other factors, rather than by improving overall efficiency,
we considered TFP a more reliable indicator of efficiency improvement.
Total Factor Productivity.  Performance on TFP is mixed.  In three of the twelve
companies (Ghana Water, Mexico Electricity, and Senegal Telecoms) declining TFP
began to increase after the contracts were introduced, while three others (India Electricity,
Philippines Water and Senegal Electricity; see figure 4) suffered a downturn in what had
been an improving TFP trend.  The six remaining firms continued their precontract trends
upward. This ambiguous finding shows no strong relation between the contracts and TFP.
Exogenous Factors.  Our performance measures suggest that the contracts had little
positive impact, as figure 5 shows. To assess whether this could be attributed to other
factors which might have blunted or negated the influence of the contracts, we first
checked for the presence of any exogenous factors that could have affected the
performance trends.  Specifically we looked for important changes in input or output
markets or prices, natural or man-made disasters, major work stoppages or any other
major events reported in the companies' annual reports or cited by country and company
experts.  We also compared the companies' trends with trends in other variables (notably
with GDP growth) to see if an acceleration or deceleration in growth might have affected
performance. 35
In two cases we found exogenous factors which might have influenced trends --
Philippines Electricity and Senegal Telecoms. The postcontract return on assets of
Philippines Electricity was adversely affected by increases in the cost of imported oil, but
this cannot explain its poor performance in constant priced TFP.  TFP might have been31
adversely affected by disruptions caused by the Luzon earthquake, plus devastating
typhoons in 1989 and 1990; however, observers knowledgeable about the company
regard its performance as consistently weak.  Moreover, other disasters (the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption and Ormoc flood in 1991) had not prevented the firm from recovering its
productivity levels.
Senegal Telecom may have benefitted from the fact that it was split off from the
postal service in 1986, the first year of the contract. Although we have tried to isolate the
telecommunications side prior to this split, that may not always have been possible, and
could cause the period before the contract to look worse than it otherwise would.  (The
split itself is not strictly exogenous; even though it was not explicitly part of the contract,
it was part of the agreement with the World Bank to implement the two together and a
case could be made that they were interdependent.)  In any event, if the Senegal Telecom
improvement is indeed overstated, it would strengthen our finding that the contracts had
no discernable positive impact on performance.
V.  Conclusions
Only three of the twelve case study companies showed a turnaround in TFP after
contracts were introduced, six continued their past trends, and three performed
substantially worse under contracts than before.  Labor productivity improved at a faster
pace in four cases, and deteriorated in none, but for most SOEs the improvement long
predates the contracts.  ROA deteriorated in three firms; the rest showed little change.32
Thus, the evidence from this sample gives little support to the premise that explicit
contracts helped improve SOE performance.
If we compare the contracting problems in figure 1 with contract performance we also
see no clear patterns. The contracts with the least problems (Korea Electricity and
Telecom) were with companies which showed no change in performance; the two SOEs
continued their pre contract (improving) trends. Since these contracts had problems of
managerial commitment, this may be a necessary condition for performance contracts to
have a positive impact on performance.
As we mentioned, performance contracting assumes that government's objectives can
be maximized, and performance improved, by setting targets which take into account the
constraints placed on managers. For this to occur, the principals will need to be willing
explicitly to state their objectives, assign priorities to multiple objectives (by assigning
weights), translate these objectives into targets aimed at performance improvement,
provide incentives to meet these targets (or monitor the agents without incurring
substantial costs), and credibly signal their commitment to the contract.
All these assumptions failed to materialize in our sample,  First, with the exception of
Korea, the governments negotiating our sample contracts chose to hide their true
objective functions and pledge actions that they were not motivated to implement.
Second, with the exception of India, Korea and Mexico, the supervisory agencies were
given neither the capacity nor the incentives to negotiate, monitor and evaluate well.
Their information disadvantage was reinforced by other government actions, such as
giving-them low pay and status, frequently moving them within the government and33
failing to force the SOEs to comply with their information requirements. Most of the
contracts fell victim to information asymmetries which led governments to set incentive
mechanisms too low to persuade managers to comply.
Why would governments introduce the contract process and then not try to make it
work? Some governments may have been motivated to make promises that were
politically unrealistic because the contracts allowed them to earn foreign assistance.  Such
assistance might not have been forthcoming if they could only promise the marginal
improvements possible without changes in government behavior.  This may have been
the case in the contracts in Senegal and Ghana where the negotiating agents pledged
actions (regular increases in tariffs, end to arrears) that were not politically possible, and
in the Philippines, where target achievement depended on government actions that were
politically unlikely.  That they did this knowingly is suggested by the fact that the
problems they pledged to correct were long standing and had proved immutable.
Less hard to interpret is the lack of commitment of the managers.  In contrast to a
private firm, the SOE managers in our sample had little choice but to sign the contract
(the case of Senegal Electricity notwithstanding). Not surprisingly, managers with
information advantages and bargaining power, and without high powered incentives or
credible commitment from government, chose to use their advantages to manipulate the
targets so as to assure that their performance would be judged as satisfactory. In essence,
the sample performance contracts failed to reduce the problems caused by the absence of
a clear residual claimant with a direct financial stake in the SOE's surplus.34
This analysis has policy implications for developing country governments considering
performance contracts.  Such contracts will only succeed if the contracting problems
described here can be overcome.  This suggests that contracting governments will need
to:
*  Reduce information asymmetries by improving accounting practices and the skills of
negotiators and evaluators.  Where market failures don't rule out competition,
information could be improved by breaking up monopolies; where products are
homogeneous or easily compared, and technology is relatively simple and stable,
information could be enhanced by allowing managers to bid for the contract. 36
*  Give the bureaucrats and other actors involved the contract discussions independence,
adequate pay, stability and the power to punish intentional misinformation or
withholding of information.
*  Clearly specify and enforce high powered rewards and penalties when the government
has adequate information.
*  Take politically costly actions at the outset and throughout the process to signal to
managers that they will have enough freedom to achieve their targets, such as
allowing layoffs of redundant workers or by regulating prices to permit an efficient
firm to earn a reasonable return.
*  Set up and abide by a neutral, third party enforcement arrangement (such as an
arbitration board).
*  Design a contract with few (two or three) comprehensive, weighted targets, which are
stable over a period of time.35
Design self-enforcing contracts, by, for example, making managers post a bond that
they will forfeit if they fail to meet the agreed targets (as was done in China, for
example).
Whether a performance contract will succeed if all of these measures are implemented is
an open question. Our sample is small, and it is not representative of the contracts used in
transitional economies for competitive SOEs; we lacked controls (SOEs without
contracts), and we used relatively stringent criteria for assessing performance change. 37
Since all the contracts failed to improve performance, we cannot say with certainty
whether or not a well designed contract would have done better.  Also unknown is
whether alternatives which create a residual claimant, such as contracts with private
managers or sale of the enterprise to a private owners, might produce better results
(although findings in World Bank 1995 are very suggestive). What is clear is that, if the
contracts in our sample are representative of the performance contracts in use with natural
monopolies worldwide, then considerable time and effort is being expended on an
exercise with neither theoretical nor empirical justification.36
Appendix  A: The Derivation  of Equation  11
- =v{p0e'-(1+X)bQe  }+(1-v){p0e'-b0e'-XbOe  -X(0  e-Oe)-Xb(6e'-Qe')
= v(1 +X)(s-b)Oe  +(I -v){pOe'  -(I  +X)bOe'+ Xb6e'  -XbOe  -kb(Oe'  -f3e  )-x(/  e-0e)}
=v(l+X)Oe  +(l-v)(l+X){(s-b)Oe'-X(1-v)(0  e-0e)}
=(1+X){(s-b)[vfe  +(1 -v)e']-  A(1-v)(  e-0e)}
Setting  this to zero yields  equation  (11). Q.E.D.
Appendix  B: The Proof  of the Two Inequalities
The Proofs for the two inequalities  are mirror  images,  so we shall only prove the last one.
R-a  - R-a  -
Denote 0 =  - , 0 =  ; note that 0 > 0 . Then  take derivative  with
-b(e 1 + K(I))  b(el + K(I))
respect  to I (for equation  (24)), and we get
MR'  MR(p  R - a  -K'(I)  R -a  -K'(I) fb '(I)  p(0)dO  +Rp (0)  bB(e 1 K(I))2
A!J)Ps  y)UIcJ  K'(I)p(0)dO  - ~b  (e  + K(I))  - b  (e_  + K(
= fb3  -tb0K{  p(0)d0  -bK'(I)p(0)d--Rp(0)0  e  K()  + 0K(  l  K(I)
= bK'(I)  I  [gf)9(0)dO  _0  (0)]  b(e,v(0)  - b(  + K(I))  {fQ(p) 09  (
We now show that the terms in both {.  } are negative, thus the above equation is negative. The
term in the first {.} is negative because fOEp(0)dO  - x2T (x) is monotonically decreasing in x:
a  [  p(HO)do_-x 2p(x)] = -X(p(x) +xip'(x)) <O
the right hand side is non -positive because by assumption, x > 0, and Ow(O)  increases in 0,  thus,
p(0) +OTp'(0) > 0.
The second {.} term is negative because of the same assumption: Osp  (0) increases in 0,  and
0  >0.  Q. E. D.37
References
Barron, David. 1988. "Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions," in R.
Schmalensee and R. Willing (eds). Handbook of Industrial Organization.
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Besanko, David and David Sappington. 1987. Designing Regulatory Policy with Limited
Information. London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Dyer Ciss6, Nichola. 1994. "The Impact of Performance Contracts on Public Enterprise
Performance." Background paper. Policy Research Department, World Bank,
Washington, D.C.
Freixas, Xavier, Roger Guesnerie, and Jean Tirole. 1985. "Planning under Incomplete
Information and the Ratchet Effect." Review of Economic Studies. LII: 173-191.
Jones, Leroy. 1975. Public Enterprise and Economic Development: The Korean Case.
Seoul: Korea Development Institute.
. 1981. "Towards a Performance Evaluation Methodology for Public
Enterprises: With Special Reference to Pakistan." Paper presented at the
international symposium on Economic Performance of Public Enterprises,
Islamabad.
. 1985. "Public Enterprise for Whom? Perverse Distributional
Consequences of Public Operational Decisions." Economic Development and
Cultural Changes 33 (2): 333-47.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate
Firms." Journal of Political Economy. 94, Part 1:614-41.
. 1993. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. MIT
Press: Cambridge, MA
Levy, Brian, and Pablo Spiller, eds. 1996. Regulations, Institutions, and Commitment:
Comparative Studies of Telecommunications. New York: Cambridge University
Press.
Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1996. The Triumph of Reason: Knowledge
and the Foundation of Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nalebuff, Barry and Joseph Stiglitz. 1983. "Information, Competition, and Markets."
American Economic Review. 73(2):278-283.38
Nellis, John 1989. "Contract Plans and Public Enterprise Performnance."  Policy, Planning,
and Research Working Paper 118. World Bank, Washington, D.C.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
, and Barry R. Weingast. December 1989. "Constitutions and
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in
Seventeenth-Century England." The Journal of Economic History. Vol. XLIX.
No. 4.
Sappington, David E. M. 1991. "Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships." Journal of
Economic Perspectives 5 (2): 45-66.
, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1987. "Privatization, Inforrnation, and Incentives."
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper 2196. Harvard
University, Cambridge Mass.
Shirley, Mary. 1989. "Evaluating the Performance of Public Enterprises in Pakistan."
Policy, Planning, and Research Working Paper 160. World Bank, Washington,
D.C.
. 1991. "Improving Public Enterprise Performance: Lessons from South
Korea." Annales de l'economie publique sociale et coop*ative  62 (1). De Boech
Universite, Brussels.
Shleifer, Andrei and Robert W. Vishny. 1994. "Politicians and Firmns."  Quarterly Journal
of Economics. 109:995-1024.
Spence, A. Michael. 1973. "Job Market Signalling." Quarterly Journal of Economics.
353-374.
State Enterprises Commission (SEC). 1991. SOE Performance Evaluation Report. Accra,
Ghana.
. 1993.  The SOE Reform Program 1984/1992: Review and
Recommendations. Accra, Ghana.
Stiglitz, Joseph E. 1989. The Economic Role of the State. Basil Blackwell, Inc.
Carnbridge, MA.
Trivedi, Prajapati, ed. 1990. Labor Redundancy in the Transport Sector: The Case of
Chile. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.39
Vickers, John and George Yarrow. 1988. Privatization: An Economic Analysis.
Cambridge, MA.:The MIT Press.
Weitzman, Martin L. "The Ratchet Principle and Performance Incentives." The Bell
Journal of Economics. 11 (1):302-08.
Williamson, Oliver. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: The Free Press.
. 1976. "Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with
Respect to CATV." Bell Journal of Economics 7 (1): 73-104.
. 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets,
Relational Contracting. New York: Free Press.
World Bank. 1995. Bureaurcrats in Business. The Economics and Politics of Government
Ownership. Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press.40
State owned enterprises were defined as government owned or government controlled economic entities
that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling goods and services. (See Jones 1975). This definition
includes all government owned enterprises where government controls the appointment of management
either through its ownership stake or, in cases where government owns a minority of the shares, the
distribution of the remaining shares gives government control.  It excludes state owned activities such as
education or health services, that are financed in other ways, such as from government's  general revenues.
(World Bank, 1995, Box 1.  1)
2  See also Milgrom and Roberts 1992.
3
. Also see Laffont and Tirole (1993)
. Since y could be any other performance criterion, such as log(output), the linear assumption is
not as restrict as it looks.
. If interested, see appendix A for the derivation.
6
,  See Laffont and Tirole (1993).
. In another subtle way, the government can show its non-commitment by taking advantage of
new performance data to ratchet up its performance criteria (Weitzman, 1980). Consider a performance
criterion set at period t; if a firm performs better this period, the government raises the target for the next
period. The manager anticipates the negative externality of current efforts on the future stream of rewards,
and reduces current efforts relative to the level of effort that prevailed when the govermment  was commited
to repeating the optimal static performance contract. In this example when the government refuses to abide
by the optimal static contract for each period, and instead takes advantage of new information, the firm
refrains from working at the socially optimal level.
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9. See Appendix B for details of the proof.
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agencies, with the exception of the Mexican Government which did not respond.  Field interviews were
done in Ghana and Senegal by Dyer Cisse (whose interview reports were used for this article), and in  India
and Korea (during several earlier visits from 1990 to 1994) by one of the authors.  Staff from the
Philippines government responsible for the contracts were interviewed in Washington, D.C.  One of the
authors was also involved in the initial discussions of the Mexico contracts.
I  We  included  one  electricity  company  from  each  country  to test  for  industry  effects  (none  were
found).
12  Korea  Telecoms  was  created  as  a  separate  company  only  two  years  before  its  contract  started.
Senegal  Telecoms  was  created  in  the  same  year  that  it signed  its  first  contract;  we  extrapolated
backwards  two  years,  using  data  from  prereorganization  telecom  units.  We  included  Senegal
Electricity's  second  contract  (starting  in  1990), even  though  it was never  signed.  The  conclusions
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Korean  model,  using  yearly  weighted  targets).  The  conclusions  would  not  change  if  the  earlier
contract period were included.
13  Performance  improvement  should not be confused  with good performance  in some  absolute  sense.
For example,  Ghana  Water  and  Sewerage increased  TFP by an average  of 12.5 percent  a year during41
the three years of contracts for which we have data (1990, 1991 and 1992). Yet this is still a company
with almost 50 percent of its water unaccounted for and only about two-thirds of the population
served with water.
14 Independent  auditors  for Senegal  Electricity  concluded  that "the accounting  and financial  management
show  such an amount  of anomalies  and deficiencies  that the auditor  will not be able to release  an opinion
on the matter." World  Bank,  "Senegal: Note on The Institutional  Study  for the Power Sector",  Memo,
1992.
'5  A study  of Pakistan  (Shirley 1989)  found  that  poor inforrnation  also led to low  powered  incentives  there.
16 Other  obstacles  were unrealistic  objectives,  poor management,  factors  outside  the management's  and
government  control  (such  as world  markets),  failure  of international  agencies  to release  funds and public
attitudes  towards  the company.  Number  of respondents  was 17.
17Standing  boards of directors were replaced by executive boards; government representation on the
boards was reduced to two members; only board approval  of the budget was required when previously
the  supervising ministry, the  Economic Planning Board  and  the  cabinet also  had  to  approve;
responsibility  for most personnel  decisions was shifted from the supervising  ministry to the enterprise;
procurement through a centralized office was made voluntary instead of compulsory; all oversight
was centered in the contract with one yearly inspection, compared to the extensive system of controls
and inspections used before (in one year before the contracts Korea Electricity had eight different
inspections lasting 108 days); preference was shifted to  internal candidates for senior  positions
(previously over half of all such appointments were from outside the firm) and an explicit merit
assessment  was introduced (Shirley 1991, 11-12).
18 An early opinion survey of 750 employees in all ranks of the SOEs under contract found that 93
percent thought that management had improved, thanks to the performance evaluation system; 55
percent saw substantial improvement;  94 percent of the executive directors said that there had been
substantial  or significant improvement (Song  1988).
9 A sign of this waning commitment  may be the move away from public profitability, as mentioned
earlier.
20 Mexico Electricity's  experience under the contract differs from that of other SOEs in Mexico
in that the government followed through on  its commitments  under the contract. The Mexican
government distinguishes between the Financial Restructuring Pact applied to Mexico's Electricity
and performance contracts.  A World Bank assessment of Mexico's standard performance contracts
with five other SOEs concluded that the results were disappointing.  The study  attributed the
poor  outcomes  to  a  lack  of  adequate  consultation  between  government  and  the  SOEs;
government attempts to treat the contracts as one more instrument of control among many; and
targets which lack coherence, simultaneously overlapping and leaving gaps (World Bank 1992).
21 Interview with Hafeez Shaikh (1994).
22  In Ghana, government negotiators and monitors in the State Enterprises Commission (SEC) lost
power when responsibility  for energy contracts was shifted to the sector agencies.  Although the shift
only affected two SOEs directly (including one of the three in our sample), staff in the SEC believe
that the change adversely affected the credibility of all monitoring and negotiating. According to an
SEC  report  "This  situation  tends  to  create  considerable uncertainty about  who  can  require
performance information from the SOEs. This has affected the ability of the Commission to perform
its reporting and evaluation function." (SEC 1991).
23  In Korea, evaluations of how different departments, divisions and offices contributed to contract
achievements  are taken into account in internal promotions  (Shirley 1991).
24 Field interviews.42
25  In addition Philippines Electricity's targets for new lines, main lines, income, rate of regurn on
revalued assets and power generation per employee were reduced even though the company had
exceeded the target the previous year. Delays in getting information  on achievements  may be a reason
why government  agents agreed to set targets well below the previous year's achievements.
26 Public profits are private profits adjusted to measure returns to society as a whole and to exclude
factors beyond the control of managers  (Jones 1991).
27 See Jones (1993) for more on the concepts of criterion and criterion values and an excellent review
of the issues of performance  contracting.
28 Interviews with government  evaluators and knowledgeable  observers also suggest that the managers
in our sample negotiated for more and softer targets and were often responsible for changes in the
criteria.
29 Some  observers  have suggested  in discussions  of this paper  that the weaknesses  in the targets are due to a
lack of capacity  on the part of the government  agencies  or are part of the early  phase of a learning  process
about how to contract  successfully.  These  explanation  do not seem  credible  to us because  numerous  or
fluctuating  targets are found  in the entire sample,  in countries  where  govemnment  capacity  is strong  (India,
Korea  or Mexico)  and in countries  where  the contract  process  has been in place  for more  than five years
(Korea  and Senegal).
30  The data were taken from enterprise audited accounts and put into comparable formats where
necessary.  Although every effort was made to verify the accuracy of the data, in some cases the
underlying information systems are weak.  However, it seems plausible that errors are not correlated
over time and do not greatly affect the trend analysis.
31 Where assets were not revalued  by the company, we revalued  them, using company figures for
depreciation and the GDP deflator for inflation.
32 Out of a total  of 17 respondents  to this question.
33 Some  commentators  have asked  us why we did not judge each firm's performance  by its attainment  of
the economic  targets  specified  in its contract. As mentioned,  we did investigate  performance  against
targets  and found  that all of the sample  SOEs  achieved  at least satisfactory  ratings  where  a score  was
assigned  (Senegal  had no such score). However,  since  many of the targets  (as we analyzed  above)  were
subject  to manipulation,  firms  might  attain their economic  targets  under  the contract  but not necessarily
operate  more profitably  or productively.  (For example,  30 percent of India  Electricity's  score in 1991-92
depended  on the volume  of electricity  they generated;  output  went up but the use of material  inputs  rose
even faster.  India  Electricity  achieved  its target and received  a score of excellent  that year,  but its TFP fell
below  precontract  levels.
34 Its prices are nevertheless about one-third less than those charged to the private sector, but private
producers usually have more freedom  to change producer prices.
35 We also compared  performance  trends  with trends  in inflation  and interest  rates.
36 This  is not likely  to work in every potentially  competitive  sector. Financial  enterprises,  for example,
may still  have strong  information  advantages  despite  competition  because  of implicit  or explicit  safety  nets
(such  as deposit  insurance)  and the adverse  effects  of competition  on managers' incentives  to act prudently.
37 The authors are currently  studying  the experience  with performance  contracts  for competitive  and
monopoly  SOEs  in China. This  study  will correct  some  of these problems,  since it will be a much larger
sample  with controls,  and we have  both productivity  measure  and better  descriptions  of provisions  of
contracts.  Econometric  analysis  will be used.Table  1.  Nunber  of Performance  Contracts  in Developing Countries,  by Sector
Latin  Mid-East and  Central
Sector  Africa  Asia  America  North Africa  Ewuopea  Total
Transport  26  8  4  6  2  46
Telecom and Post  15  2  1  1  0  19
Extractive industries  6  26  2  2  3  39
Agriculture  13  3  2  0  0  18
Water  4  4  0  1  0  9
Electricity  11  8  6  1  1  27
Other  61  160  1  1  4  227
Total  136  211  16  12  10  385 a
a.  Data  for Romania  only. Contracts  are  also being  used  in Bulgaria,  but no details  are  available.
b. Total  figures  cover  thirty-one  countries.  In addition,  Indonesia  reports  180  firms,  and  China 103,000;
no breakdown  by industry  was  available.  Data  reflects  situation  as of June 1994. Based  on a world-wide
search  using  World  Bank  and  other sources. In some  countries  additional  contracts  may have  been  awarded.
Source: Survey  of World  Bank  reports  and staff.
Table 2.  Case  Study Enterprises
First  contract
Country  (contract  type)  Enterprise  name:  (NAME  USED  IN TEXT)  Contract  duration  vear
Ghana  (performance  contract)  Electricity Corporation of Ghana (ECG):  1989
GHANA ELECTRICITY  Yearly
Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC):  1989
GHANA WATER
Ghana Posts and Telecommunications (GP&T):  1990
GHANA TELECOM
India  (memorandum of  National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC):  1987
understanding)  INDIA ELECTRICITY  Yearly
Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC):  (published)
INDIA OIL  _
Korea (performance evaluation  Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO):  1984
and measurement system)  KOREA ELECTRICITY  List of yearly
Korea Telecommunications Authority (KTA):  targets
KOREA TELECOMS
Mexico (convenio de  Comision Federal de Electricidad (CFE):  3 years  1986
rehabilitacion financiera)  MEXICO ELECTRICITY
Philippines (performance moni-  Metropolitan Water and Sewerage System  1989
toring and evaluation system)  (MWSS):  PHILIPPINES WATER  List of yearly
National Power Corporation (NPC):  targets
PHILIPPINES ELECTRICITY
Senegal (contrat plan)  Societe Nationale d' Electricite (SENELEC):  1987
SENEGAL ELECTRICITY  3 years
Societe Nationale des Telecommunications du  1986
LSenegal  (SONATEL):  SENEGAL TELECOMS  I
Source: World  Bank data.Figure  1  Summary  of  Sample  Contracting  Problems
Information  and  Incentives  Govemment  commitment  Manageral  commitment
No  Fluctuating
Unskilled,  Unskilled,  Low  Lack  cf  No  Managerial  performance  Examples Numerous  targets
Poor  unstable  unstable  power  of  costly  3rd  party  bargaining  impact  on  of  soft  targets  (>18%  per
accounftng  negotiators  evaluators incentives signals  Reneging enforcement  power  career  targets  (>20)  year)
Ghana Elericity  *  *  c  0  0
Water  *c  C  c  *  0  0  *
Telecoms  0  0  _  C  c  c  0  0  0  0  0
India  Elericity  0  0  0  C)  0  0
Oil  0  0  C  0  0  0  C  0  0  0  0
Korea Elecdidty  0  0  0  0  0  C  C  0  0  0
Telecoms  0  0  0  0  0  C  C  0  0
Mexico Elericity  0  0  C  0  0  C  C  00
Philippines Elericity  0  *0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
Water  0  *  *  0  0*0  0  0  0
Senegal  Eledicity  0  *  0  *  0
Telecoms  0  0  *  *  *  0  *  0  0  0  0  0
0  =  Major  problem
C  =  Somewhat  of  a  problem
0  =  Utte  or  no  problemFigure 2.  Pre- and Postcontract  Performance: Net Rate of Return on Revalued Assets
ercent  SOEs showing deteriorating trends
40
30  _  . _  ~  "-  ,  - - Senegal Telecom 30  _,,-  _
20
10
. . .........................................................  Senegal Electricity
/Philppines  Electricity
0
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Source:  Company data and World Bank estimates.
Figure 3.  Pre- and Postcontract Performance:  Labor
(indexed to base year)
3  S  OEs  showin  turnaround  or acceleratiNg_provement__
2  - Gh  W  Seea
0  I  I  I  III -3  -2  -1  Base year  +1  +2  +3  +4  +5  +6  +7Figure 4.  Pre- and Postcontract Performance: Total Factor
(indexed to base year)
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Source: Company  data  and World  Bank  estimates.Figure 5. Performnance  Changes after the Introduction of Performance  Contract
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Source: Comapany  data and World Bank  estimates.Figure  6  Summary  of Contract  Outcomes
Changes  in  Trend  in:
ROA  LP  TFP
Ghana Electrcity  0  0  0
Water  0  +  +
Telecoms  0  0  0
India Electricity  0  0
Oil  0  0  0
Korea Electricity  0  0  0
Telecoms  0  0  0
Mexico Electricity  0  0  +
Philippines  Electrcity  0  0
Water  0  0
Senegal Electuicity  - 0
Telecoms  +  +
0 = No  change  in  trend
+ = Trend  improved
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